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In a fair and honest system the strong protect the 
weaker ones. In Belarus, helping the weak means 
ensuring low prices on food, utility services, fuel, 
transport and medicine. Helping the weak is giving 
them the right to choose goods and services of the 
best, from their viewpoint, quality-price ratio. 
For the last fifteen years the Russian leadership 
constantly supplied Belarus with gas, oil and electric 
energy at the price far below the world average. 
Furthermore, the terms of supply were more than 
favourable. Belarus was an ‘oil offshore’ and a ‘gas 
Mecca’ since the gas was so cheap that we could 
simply ignore the costs.  
The cheap Russian energy resources let the Belaru-
sian leadership to protect the weak. The electricity 
and utility services rates were extremely low for a 
long time. Selling oil products to Europe helped to 
stabilize the Belarusian rouble, fill the budget gap 
and raise pensions and salaries. That was the real 
support for the people of modest means and low 
income. No doubt, the oil barons of Russia and 
Belarus, just as the other operators of the energy 
market, made big fortunes, but the ordinary people 
also got their rake-off.  
The partners, i.e. the leadership of Russia and Bela-
rus, were mostly on good terms. Once in a while we 
observed fits of anger and exchange of ‘hot’ words. 
In a temper, they remembered the great patriotic 
war, the air defence and the orthodox brotherhood 
of the eastern Slavs. However, nothing united the 
officials, oligarchs and politicians of both countries 
more than sharing the energy rent. Meanwhile, a 
great deal of the money was to get into the budget 
of both countries to ensure price reduction for 
consumers. For many years the sharing went on 
well. No excesses happened. The oil boom has 
become the direct and indirect source for dozens 
of thousands multimillion and even billion strong 
fortunes, primarily, in Russia.  
Oil and gas markets are not like selling coffee or Big 
Macs. The entry is strictly controlled at the very top 
of the government. There are no accidental people 
here. The lists of those allowed to make big money 
Energy disputes between Russia and the transit 
countries traditionally mark the end or beginning 
of each year. A pretty quiet settlement of gas and oil 
supplies between Russia and Ukraine in November-
December 2009 has partly increased the attention 
to Belarus. Whereas negotiations on gas provision 
are still continuing, Russia and Belarus have finally 
agreed on the conditions of oil supply on 27 Janu-
ary 2010. Each side presented the outcomes of ‘oil 
negotiations’, accompanied by quite rough rhetoric, 
as a victory. Yaroslav Romanchuk’s contribution 
analyzes who in fact benefits from energy and trade 
disputes between Russia and Belarus.
The results of negotiations on the supply of energy 
resources have an immense effect on Belarusian 
economy. Not only the prices in the internal mar-
ket are affected, but also the amount of budget 
devoted to increase pensions and social benefits 
is determined by these results. Siarhei Nikoliuk 
in his article refers to the Belarusian authorities’ 
capacity to meet its social obligations even under 
the circumstances of the crisis. Certainly, it happens 
not without Russia’s indirect support. 
When it comes to the bilateral energy rows between 
Russia and Belarus, it is worth asking which side 
has already started to go over the top. Russia would 
risk supporting an even more questionable ally 
taking every chance to blackmail it. Belarus in turn 
would end up in the inability to carry out its social 
obligations which every personalist regime is based 
upon. Given new Russia’s energy transportation 
projects and Presidential elections in Belarus, the 
situation in the closest European neighbourhood 
becomes even more challenging.   
Julija Narkeviciute, Editor
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are discussed longer than the country’s budget or 
monetary and fiscal policy. Recently the Kremlin 
was so kind to tell us the names of the Belarusian 
oil ‘heroes’. These are Yury Chizh and his structures, 
Nikolai Vorobey, Anatoly Ternavskiy, Vladimir 
Bryntsalov, Mikhail Gutsiriyev, and the Bazhanovs. 
They can be considered the first citizens of the 
Union State. They make full use of this amorphous 
legal formation, which purpose is still not clear for 
the ordinary people.  
Among the oil ‘barons’ we can also name CEOs 
and government supervisors of Belarusian Oil 
Company, PO Belorusneft, Naftan, and Mozyr oil 
refinery plant. These are a few hundred people from 
commercial, administrative and security depart-
ments. Namely they make oil refinement in a current 
tax and administrative environment formally close 
to ‘unprofitable’, meanwhile the ‘cream’ of the oil 
schemes, including the ‘black’ ones, accumulates 
far beyond the borders of Russia and Belarus.  
The ‘barons’ used the union state and the customs 
union as a political cover or a ‘legend’. The legend 
made it possible to keep a significant difference both 
between the oil price for Belarus and at the world 
market, between the oil export duty for Belarus and 
the rest of the world. ‘Integration’ has become an 
ideologeme of the energy projects. A. Lukashenka, 
with all his political and PR talents, would not 
have been able to support it all by himself, without 
active participation of his Russian lobbyists (the 
military, some oil barons, the Russian Orthodox 
Church, and the supporters of the return of the 
Soviet Empire).  
They all knew that the above mentioned integra-
tion projects do not contribute to the freedom 
of movement of goods, services, money and the 
workforce to grow. Non-tariff restrictions, budget 
subsidies, special prices for raw materials, soft loans 
for certain exporters, quotas and special certifica-
tion treatment – all these measures applied by both 
countries doom not only the customs union but 
even the free trade zone. However, the supporters 
of real freedom in trade relations between Russia 
and Belarus did not have enough lobby power 
to withstand the vigour of energy lobbyists from 
both sides. Obviously, they were dividing not the 
modest budget doughnut of Belarus, but the huge 
resource pie of Russia.  
The recent oil ‘war’ was a commercial conflict to a 
large extent.  The oil barons and oligarchs of both 
countries were no longer happy with the rules of 
sharing the oil pie. The Russian oil barons and their 
supervisors decided they want the bigger part of 
the oil rent, ownership of Belarusian oil refinery 
plants and complete control over the transit of 
their oil, gas and electric power to Europe. The oil 
barons in Russia do not care about the interests 
of the Russian small businesses and the ordinary 
people who could profit from working in Belarus 
and consuming the Belarusian goods.  
The Kremlin wants more influence on the foreign 
and defence policy of Belarus as a price for sup-
porting the Belarusian economy for so many years. 
It would not mind buying the attractive Belarusian 
assets through the friendly commercial structures 
and, finally, secure free competition with the Be-
larusian goods in our home market. Obviously, 
according to the Russian rules and standards. 
The recent oil dispute which the Belarusian au-
thorities entered was also aimed at defending the 
interests of the local oil barons and not defending 
the principles of the common market. Since officials 
in the President’s office and heads of ministries 
are very well aware that there is no trade freedom 
between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian 
Federation. After all it was them who approved the 
quotas for domestic goods in the retail trade (90% 
foods and 80% non-foods). It is them who hamper 
import by various means: restrictions on currency 
purchase, certificates, or special conditions of com-
mercial tenders.   
If the government cared about the consumers, the 
ordinary people, it would by all means support open 
competition, the Russian producers included. It 
would have never pushed to such a conflict when 
representatives of states are directly blackmailing 
each other. Even though A. Lukashenka managed 
to get easy conditions of energy resource supplies 
in the past, he should have known the limits. Just 
push over the top – and you’ll get an emotional 
and ruthless response.  
The Kremlin today is not the same as it was in early 
2000’s. The golden age for privatization of Belarusian 
assets is gone. It’s in 2007 – early 2008 one could 
still ask for billions of dollars for selling a control 
stock of a Belarusian oil refinery plant. Today, when 
Russia is building roundabout transit channels (the 
very decision of the Russian leadership is a strategic 
failure of the official Minsk), when the crisis puts 
severe limits on budget manoeuvring, when nega-
tive feelings between Russian and Belarus’s leaders 
run high, demanding from the Kremlin to keep the 
status quo of 2003-2008, i.e. subsidize the Belarusian 
economy, means going over the top.  
A. Lukashenka refused to accept the grant of about 
$1.8 billion (~4% of GDP), demanding almost four 
times more, i.e. about 20% of GDP. He is ready to 
sell the oil refinery enterprises only for the ‘old price’, 
and with 22 conditions to top it all. Obviously, he 
ignores the fact that the Belarusian oil industry 
costs only a thin dime and the transit oil lines to 
Europe turn into a piece of a rusting pipe without 
the Russian oil. 
Having got into the trap of own mistakes, the Bela-
rusian rulers try to blackmail the Kremlin with high 
tariffs on oil transit. All of a sudden they attached 
tariffs on electric power transit to Lithuania and 
Kaliningrad region to the oil negotiations. One never 
knows when Belarus will start using the arguments 
like “We don’t charge you for our air defence serv-
ices”, “We are your only anti-West companions, we 
keep the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church 
firm and steadfast and the memory of glorious 
years of the Patriotic War is simply invaluable”, 
“We haven’t even applied for NATO membership 
– and that has its cost”, “If you smash us with oil, 
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Sergei Nikoliuk, political scientist 
The last year’s main event is self-evident. This is the 
economic crisis. Public opinion polls conducted by 
the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and 
Political Studies in December 2008 and in March 
2009 suggested that the economic crisis could turn 
into a social one (Table 1-2). In particular, the finan-
cial situation of Belarusian population decreased 
to the minimum recorded in 1994.
However, such a critical public response was 
largely triggered not by the real deterioration of 
life standards, but by negative media information. 
This can be proven by a significant reduction of 
people’s expectations in the fourth quarter of 2008 
compared to their financial situation. Long-term 
observations show that public expectations are 
highly sensitive to the information disseminated 
through the media, whereas the perception of 
individual financial situation is more inertial to 
it. It is worth notice that the main contribution to 
the dynamics of both indices is made by peripheral 
social groups (the elderly, low-educated, rural area 
residents).
Meanwhile, in the first quarter of 2009, the economic 
expectations of Belarusian citizens did not change 
significantly, while the financial situation worsened 
dramatically. That, however, was a clear sign that 
the negative trend has ran out of steam and by the 
next quarterly survey one should expect a break-
ing point in the public moods towards a positive 
direction, as it was recorded in June. Thus, the 
social crisis ‘melted away’ in people‘s minds before 
it had developed. 
we will ruin your empire ambitions by leaving the 
customs union and giving up the union state for 
lost”. Monetization of these arguments is strongly 
dependent on I. Sechin’s and V. Putin’s immunity 
to the old integration schemes. It also depends on 
A. Lukashenka’s desire and ability to propose new 
schemes of dividing the oil and energy rent.  
In the long run, neither the V. Putin, nor Lukashenka 
need the prolonged energy conflict. The rather that 
the EU is very nervous even about the hypothetic 
threat to the energy resources delivery. They are 
ready to pay for peace and to support any regime 
which ensures delivery of oil and gas supplies. The 
oil conflict adds no electoral support either to the 
Belarusian leader, or to V. Putin / D. Medvedev. 
Thus the parties will find a compromise on the 
issues of the volume of duty-free oil for domestic 
consumption in Belarus, the oil price and Naftan 
ownership. Tolling or sharing out the export duty 
– one can design many schemes to hide the super 
profits from oil and oil products sale to the EU from 
the budgets of Russia and Belarus.  
The conflict will be over, but we will still feel the 
bitter taste of it. The balance will be short and shaky, 
the struggle will continue on the food, machine-
building, motor-car, furniture and other markets. 
And it’s not going to be a struggle under the WTO 
rules, or the EU standards, but about taking the 
law (understood differently by each party) into 
their own hands.  
The presidential election in Belarus is just around 
the corner. A. Lukashenka is in desperate need for 
economic and social showings. Not on paper, but 
in the pockets and stomachs of the nomenclature 
and ordinary voters. With all the allegiance of Piotr 
Prokopovich and the money machine of the Bela-
rusian National Bank, it’s impossible to reach them 
without the energy support from the Kremlin. 
The Belarus-Russia relations entered into a long 
game. The victims will be ordinary people and 
small businesses. We can’t avoid growing prices 
on fuel, utility services and transport. We will not 
do it without cuts of budget revenue. The number 
of bankrupt enterprises and redundant people on 
Russia-oriented plants will increase. 
The rich oil barons of both countries will hardly 
weep. It is the voters used to freebies who will feel 
the freezing breath of the real economic crisis. Is it 
worth then entering an oil war against Russia?
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Table 1. Dynamics of responses to the question How has your personal financial situation changed 
for the last three months, are you financially better off or worse off? (in %)
Answer 11’06 09’08 12’08 03’09 06’09 09’09 12’09
Better off 21 18 9 2 6 11 7
Same 65 59 55 31 57 48 66
Worse off 13 22 34 64 37 37 26
1  ( 1 1 ) ,  Fe b ru a r y  2 0 1 0
4
The negative trend changed into a positive one 
under the influence of the step-down adaptation 
mechanism. There is nothing new and unusual 
in that. By their historical habit, in response to 
worsening living conditions Belarusians tend not to 
act, but to cut down on their needs. Furthermore, 
we must pay tribute to the authorities who made 
every effort to keep wages and social benefits on 
the pre-crisis level.
Independent experts are rather critical towards 
official economic statistics, including the indicators 
reflecting the level of growth of the real income of 
population. However, survey data suggest, there are 
no objective grounds for talking about the lowering 
of life standards. As Table 3 shows, the crisis did 
not make Belarusians change their life strategies. 
Compared with the pre-crisis 2007, the percent-
age of respondents opting for survival “at the most 
primitive level of existence” did not increase. On the 
contrary, a reverse trend began to show: the level 
of material needs grew quite appreciably.
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Table 2. Dynamics of responses to the question Looking ahead, how will the socio-economic 
situation in Belarus change within the next few years? (in %)
Answer 11’06 09’08 12’08 03’09 06’09 09’09 12’09
Get better 43 34 14 14 28 33 35
Same 38 41 35 31 38 35 37
Get worse 11 18 38 46 25 21 16
Table 3. Dynamics of answering the question Talking about the life of your family, what goals 
you and your family members set for yourself? (in %)
Answer 12’07 12’08 12’09
to survive, albeit at the most primitive level of existence 13 12 7
to live not worse than most families in your town, neighbourhood 49 45 40
to live better than most families in your town, neighbourhood 19 20 27
to live as an average family in Western Europe or the USA lives 12 15 17
to live better than an average family in Western Europe or the USA lives 6 5 8
Table 4. Dynamics of responses to the question Within the past 12 months, how many times did 
you face a delay in payment of a wage or a pension? (in %)
Answer 09’02 09’03 03’09 06’09 09’09 12’09
Not a single time 31 53 67 70 73 70
Once 12 9 11 8 10 10
Several times 36 26 17 16 14 16
Every month 21 11 4 3 2 3
The fact that the apocalyptic scenario in Belarus 
did not become a reality is confirmed by answers 
to the questions in Table 4. Unlike responses to 
the previous questions, they show not opinions, 
which interpretation is always debatable, but 
facts. In 2002 – 2003 there was no talk about the 
economic crisis in the country, but 69% and 46% 
of Belarusians respectively encountered wage and 
pension arrears. Last year, the proportion of such 
citizens did not exceed 33%, and the proportion of 
those who experienced monthly wage and pension 
arrears was within the margin of error.
No surprise that the electoral rating of the president 
Aleksandr Lukashenka, contrary to the predictions, 
remained stable and did not fall below 39% during 
the crisis. This is a new trend. After the presidential 
elections in 2001, when oil prices were low and, 
therefore, the level of subsidies from Russia was 
also low, the growth of real incomes of the popu-
lation dropped from 18% to 4%, resulting in the 
decrease of rating of the head of the state to 27%. 
In late 2003, on the tide of growing world oil prices, 
Belarus became the so-called ‘oil offshore’ allowing 
its leaders to afford the return to two-digit growth 
of people’s real income. 
During January – November 2009, the real income 
of the population increased only by 2.8%, but, as I 
mentioned above, that did not affect the rating of 
the state leader. It also has to do with the fact that 
the slowdown in growth of real incomes occurred 
after the five ‘fat’ years, which the majority of Bela-
rusians associate with the policy of A. Lukashenka. 
Furthermore, opinion polls show, the proportion of 
respondents who believe that the economic crisis 
in Belarus is ‘in essence, a complete consequence’ 
of the global crisis is two times bigger than the 
proportion of those who link the beginning of the 
crisis to the country’s leadership policy. It is natu-
ral that such distribution of responsibility creates 
a desire to unite around the strong leader at the 
time of external threats. Thus, nothing threatens 
social stability in Belarus today. The rather that, the 
President obliges himself to increase salaries. 
It is clear that the president’s benefits package is 
not limited by a salary increase only. Despite the 
fact that in November 2009, pensions were in-
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creased by almost 9% (Belarusian pensioners had 
to wait for this increase since August 2008), on 1 
January 2010 pensions were raised again, and with 
them benefits for child care – up to 100% of the 
minimum subsistence income. According to the 
adopted budget, allocations for social policy will 
grow by 114%. Those who want to improve their 
living conditions are also not forgotten. A range of 
financial benefits is provided for them. Against this 
background, 7% growth of allocations for health 
care and education is a sorry sight.
It would seem that the Belarusian authorities should 
have used the global financial and economic crisis 
as an excuse for giving up previously adopted social 
obligations. But they appeared to be not ready for 
this. Authoritarian personalist regimes prone to 
populism feel their dependence on the society. 
The stability of such regimes rests on personal 
popularity of the main persona. While setting pri-
orities, authoritarian personalist regimes sacrifice 
the economy for the sake of momentary political 
results. Compare the Belarusian ‘unheard-of gen-
erosity’ with the Latvian frugality. Facing budget 
deficits the Latvian government had to considerably 
reduce the state employees’ salaries as well as cut 
pensions and benefits.
The Belarusian ruling elite, used to control the 
growth of welfare, is not able to launch a crisis 
management policy. Moreover, it is not able to 
comprehend the full depth of the new challenges. 
The Belarusian president likes to point out that 
he makes decisions ‘guided by life’. But today it 
seems that he has lost the ability to grasp the real 
life trends.
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